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Abstract
These days, it appears to be common ground that what is
illegal and punishable offline must also be treated as such in
online formats. However, the enforcement of laws in the
field of hate speech and fake news in social networks faces
a number of challenges. Public policy makers increasingly
rely on the regu-lation of user generated online content
through private entities, i.e. through social networks as
intermediaries. With this privat-ization of law enforcement,
state actors hand the delicate bal-ancing of (fundamental)
rights concerned off to private entities. Different strategies
complementing traditional law enforcement mechanisms in
Europe will be juxtaposed and analysed with particular
regard to their respective incentive structures and conse-
quential dangers for the exercise of fundamental rights.
Propositions for a recommendable model honouring both
pri-vate and public responsibilities will be presented.
1 Introduction: Fake News and
Hate Speech on Social
Networks
The Internet provides platforms for many forms of
speech, with social networks emphasising user-gener-
ated content (UGC) like tweets, Facebook posts and
Instagram pictures and videos. Digitally expressed ‘hate
speech’ and ‘fake news’ on social networks have been the
topic of public debate worldwide. The term ‘fake news’
has only recently entered colloquial language. While it is
applied in different contexts to characterise political
sentiments, manipulation and propaganda, use is made
of the term here to describe deliberately false factual
claims, i.e. disinformation with no viable basis. False
claims are susceptible to be proven either wrong or false,
which distinguishes them from opinions.
In that sense, fake news, much like hate speech and def-
amation, are not new phenomena. However, the particu-
larities of the Internet add a new dimension to them.1
The Web 2.0, i.e. websites designed to allow easy con-
* The author is research coordinator at the Center for Advanced Study
‘Law as Culture’, University of Bonn.
1. D. Cucereanu, Aspects of Regulating Freedom of Expression on the
Internet (2008), at 7.
tent creation by end users,2 facilitates the dissemination
of defamatory material. The reach of statements made
online in social networks is increased by social media
functions like sharing and liking posts. Due to these
mechanisms, statements can ‘go viral’, i.e. trigger a
snowball effect. They lead to a quick and global spread
at no extra cost for the source. These effects largely lie
beyond the control of the statement’s creator, though
they can be wilfully enhanced by different means
including bots.
Hate speech is a political term rather than a legal one. It
is not a clear-cut concept; it can encompass incivilities as
well as insults and defamation. The specific danger of
hate speech lies within the disparagement of a particular
group of people. Traditionally, the term ‘hate speech’
refers to expressions inciting hatred, mainly racial,
national or religious in nature.3 Individuals are offended
as members of a group, for example by reason of nation-
ality, gender, race, ethnicity, religion or sexual tenden-
cies. Hate speech has been found particularly worrisome
by policy makers as it can stimulate further hatred
against these groups. It can greatly influence recipients
of such messages depending on the speaker’s influence,
the message’s dissemination and the social and historical
context and can be understood as call for action against
the targeted groups. While hate can be planted both by
illegal and undesirable content, the regulation of UGC,
however, has to respect the boundaries of the law.
These boundaries define the degree to which the exer-
cise of individual fundamental rights such as free speech
is limited in order to safeguard other rights such as the
general right of personality.
In recent years, the question has shifted from whether to
regulate online activities to how to do it. While John
Perry Barlow proclaimed the independence of cyber-
space in his 1996 declaration of the same name,4 the cur-
rent prevailing opinion is that illegality offline equals
illegality online.5 Substantive law standards are thus also
2. T. O’Reilly, What Is Web 2.0 – Design Patterns and Business Models
for the Next Generation of Software (2005), available at https:// www.
oreilly. com/ pub/ a/ web2/ archive/ what -is -web -20. html.
3. See H. Darbishire, Hate Speech: New European Perspectives, Roma
Rights, No. 4 (1999), available at www. errc. org/ article/ hate -speech -
new -european -perspective/ 1129; F.M. Lawrence, ‘Resolving the Hate
Crimes/Hate Speech Paradox: Punishing Bias Crimes and Protecting
Racist Speech’, 68 Notre Dame Law Review 673 (1993).
4. J. P. Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, Davos,
Switzerland, 8 February 1996, available at https:// www. eff. org/ de/
cyberspace -independence.
5. See UK House of Commons, ‘Hate Crime: Abuse, Hate and Extremism
Online’, Fourteenth Report of Session 2016-17, HC 609, at 11 (2017);
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applicable to online contexts. Nonetheless, an online–
offline divide cannot be denied when it comes to the
enforcement of substantive law, namely, criminal law
provisions, in social networks. The special environ-
ments of social networks and the often-invoked border-
less nature of the Internet pose massive challenges for
an effective law enforcement. Particularities of these
environments, principally the relative anonymity of
users, the fast dissemination of large volumes of UGC
across borders and the global activity of platform opera-
tors set significant hurdles.
Social networks were initially rather seen as merely
opening new means of communication for users without
triggering a responsibility for UGC.6 Faced with the
particularities of the Internet, state actors have increas-
ingly opted to assign responsibility to social networks as
intermediaries. Sweden already passed a law to that
effect in 1998,7 while there were no ‘precise ideas’ on
the enforcement of ICT law in Germany, France, the
United Kingdom and the United States in 2000.8 The
debates on fake news and hate speech emerged later on
and recently invited a number of state interventions
worldwide.
In Germany, the ‘Act to Improve the Enforcement of
Rights on Social Networks’ was adopted in 2017.9 It has
gained international attention, as it threatens large fines
on social networks that systematically breach their obli-
gations regarding the timely removal of illegal UGC. In
the United Kingdom and the Russian Federation, the
German law has been cited as model for respective legis-
lative projects. The UK Home Affairs Committee of the
House of Commons recommended ‘that the Govern-
ment consult on a system of escalating sanctions to
include meaningful fines for social media companies
which fail to remove illegal content within a strict time-
frame’.10 The Russian Duma advanced a bill considered
‘copy-and-paste of Germany’s hate speech law’ shortly
after its adoption.11
In Europe and elsewhere, traditional law enforcement
mechanisms are considered inadequate to implement
legal provisions in the field of online hate speech and
fake news. More and more public policy makers in
Europe and elsewhere are contemplating and adopting
various additional mechanisms to put the respective
laws into effect.
In that context, the German venture appears to show
model character, but is it really a good policy example?
How does it hold up in comparison with other systems
B.-J. Koops, ‘Cybercrime Legislation in the Netherlands’, in P.C. Reich
(ed.), Cybercrime and Security (2005) 1, at 6.
6. D.M. Boyd and N.B. Ellison, ‘Social Network Sites: Definition, History,
and Scholarship’, 13 Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication
210 (2007).
7. See 2.6.
8. B.-J. Koops, J. E. J. Prins & H. Hijmans, ICT Law and Internationalisation
(2000), at 129.
9. See 2.5.
10. House of Commons, above n. 5, at 14.
11. Reporters Without Borders, ‘Russian Bill is Copy-And-Paste of Germa-
ny’s Hate Speech Law’, published 19 July 2017, available at https:// rsf.
org/ en/ news/ russian -bill -copy -and -paste -germanys -hate -speech -law.
in the European Union? A comparative model analysis
will reveal advantages and dangers so as to contribute to
the shaping of a superior model for law enforcement in
social networks.
Different laws and policy approaches currently in effect
in the Europe will be described (2) before turning to the
underlying question of delimitating the roles of public
and private actors (3). Against that background, three
models will be distinguished and evaluated with particu-
lar regard to dangers for the exercise of free speech (4).
Finally, conclusions and propositions for a recommend-
able model for law enforcement in social networks hon-
ouring both private and public responsibilities will be
presented (5).
2 Law Enforcement Strategies
in Social Networks
Law enforcement has a servicing function in relation to
the substantive law. Traditional law enforcement mech-
anisms are put into place by the state. More and more,
alternatives are considered by policy makers in numer-
ous fields of law.12 With regard to illegal UGC on social
networks, legal norms have been created and policy ini-
tiatives launched to complement criminal prosecution
and civil law actions. Balkin characterised these informal
control measures as new-school speech regulation rather
than old-school speech regulation like penalties and
injunctions directed at speakers and publishers.13
Following a short overview of the legal provisions to be
enforced in the context of hate speech and fake news
(2.1), the traditional law enforcement strategies of crim-
inal prosecution and civil law actions will be scanned
with particular regard to mechanisms to overcome
online anonymity (2.2). These laws are complemented
by EU law and policy. The elemental legal source with-
in the European Union is the E-Commerce Directive of
2000 (2.3). More recently, the EU Commission has,
however, favoured voluntary commitments by social
networks (2.4). On a national level, the German and the
Swedish regulation will be described (2.5 and 2.6)
before briefly summarising the findings (2.7).
2.1 Enforceable Legal Provisions
Online content is illegal when it is contrary to the appli-
cable legal order. In the context of fake news and hate
speech, relevant legal provisions are mainly national
criminal and civil law affording protection of honour
and rights of personality. In addition to criminal prose-
cution, unlawful statements touching a person’s honour,
reputation or personality rights generally also trigger the
civil liability of the infringer.
12. See for competition law and ADR, J. Basedow, ‚Rechtsdurchsetzung
und Streitbeilegung – Die Vielfalt von Durchsetzungsformen im Lichte
von Zielkonflikten‘, JZ 1, at 5 ff. (2018).
13. J.M. Balkin, ‘Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation’, 127 Harvard
Law Review 2296, at 2298 (2014).
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Despite certain efforts,14 fake news is not as such illegal
in most countries. Regarding both hate speech and fake
news, defamation and insult laws are relevant. A num-
ber of legal orders foresee a specific criminal provision
for cases in which the fact supported by the speaker is
false.15 Prohibited behaviours in the context of hate
speech vary widely, also among the Member States of
the European Union.16 International instruments such
as the EU Council Framework Decision on combating cer-
tain forms and expressions of racism and xenophobia by
means of criminal law,17 the UN Convention on the elimi-
nation of all forms of racial discrimination of 21 December
1965 and the Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the
Convention on cybercrime concerning the criminalization of
acts of a racist and xenophobic nature committed through
computer systems of 28 January 2003 have only had a very
limited harmonising effect.
Under the aforementioned EU Framework Decision,
hate speech is to be considered a criminal offence when
it publicly encourages violence or hatred against a per-
son or group of people because of race, colour, religion,
descent or national or ethnic origin. Even so, public
incitement to violence is only criminalised in some
Member States when its manner is likely to disturb
public order or public peace.18 In addition, varying def-
amation and insult laws play a considerable role in the
fight against hate speech when penalising collective def-
amation and insults of groups.
In some countries, mainly Common Law countries, a
demise of criminal defamation and insult law could be
observed.19 In the context of fake news and hate speech,
however, these provisions have (re-)gained importance.
Online communication, especially on social networks,
has made defamation and insult laws very topical.20
While rules on the illegality of statements differ, the
problem of how to put existing rules to effect in social
networks contexts occurs in all legal orders.
2.2 Traditional Public Law Enforcement
Mechanisms and Its Limits
Traditional public law enforcement encompasses the
criminal prosecution of perpetrators (2.2.1) as well as
civil legal protection afforded (2.2.2). In online contexts,
their effectiveness is largely called into question by the
relative anonymity provided to social network users so
14. E.g. U.S. Honest Ads Bill of 2017, 115th Congress, 1st session, S. 1989.
15. E.g. Germany, Greece and Switzerland.
16. Mandola Intermediate Report – Monitoring and Detecting Online Hate
Speech in the Framework of Rights, Equality and Citizenship Pro-
gramme of the EU Commission of 20 July 2016, at 9, available at
http:// mandola -project. eu/ m/ filer_ public/ 7b/ 8f/ 7b8f3f88 -2270 -47ed
-8791 -8fbfb320b755/ mandola -d21. pdf.
17. 2008/913/JHA of November 2008; follow-up to Joint Action
96/443/JHA of 15 July 1996.
18. Mandola Intermediate Report, above n. 16, at 10.
19. See e.g. UK Defamation Act 2013 (c 26); for an overview of U.S. States;
see L.Y. Garfield, ‘The Death of Slander’, 17 Columbia Journal of Law
& the Arts 17, at 53-54.
20. See for the U.S.A. A. J. Wagner and A. L. Fargo, ‘Criminal Libel in the
Land of the First Amendment’, Special Report for the International
Press Institute, at 27-28 (2015).
that tools helping to overcome that online anonymity are
specifically taken into account (2.2.3).
2.2.1 Criminal Prosecution
Criminal prosecution presupposes not only personal
jurisdiction over the accused, but generally also his
presence at trial, which might prove difficult in interna-
tional contexts with extradition treaties being limited.
Criminal provisions are generally enforced by institut-
ing proceedings in the proper court on behalf of the
public. In that case, the public prosecutor somehow
learns of potential illegal online activity, investigates ex
officio and then brings charges. Especially concerning
general defamation and insult laws, prosecution presup-
poses the active involvement of the affected individual.
In numerous legal orders, such charges cannot be
brought without the victim’s consent.21 Alternatively,
victims can act as a private prosecutors, file a criminal
suit and prove the relevant facts of the case without the
public prosecutor’s participation.22
The enforcement of general defamation and insult laws
is consequently already limited as it largely depends on
the victim’s authorisation or even legal action. Insofar,
law enforcement is left to the victim’s discretion. Vic-
tims also have the option of choosing civil over criminal
action, which might be preferable due to the lighter bur-
den of proof in civil cases.23 Criminal cases can also be
combined with the corresponding civil ones in many
legal orders.24
2.2.2 Civil Legal Protection
UGC on social networks can also trigger the civil liabili-
ty of the infringer. In the civil law context, sanctions
generally include injunctive relief and damages. Victims
of untrue rumours disseminated on social networks, for
example, have the demand injunctive relief and revoca-
tion from the infringer.25 This right can be secured by
means of interim injunctions. In a social media context,
the concerned can thus demand the deletion of tweets,
media or short postings. The further dissemination of
false information can be prevented by an order to rectify
false statements made. In some cases and countries, the
victim also has general civil law claims against the plat-
form operator, i.e. the social network provider. For
example, under German law, the affected individual can
request that the platform operator (temporarily) blocks
the account of the infringer in exceptional cases.26
Civil (interim) legal protection generally depends on the
active intervention of the victims. They have to issue
takedown notices or institute civil legal proceedings.
21. See S. Griffen, ‘Defamation and Insult Laws in the OSCE Region: A
Comparative Study’, at 10 (2017), available at https:// www. osce. org/
fom/ 303181 ?download= true.
22. E.g. Russian Criminal Code Art. 128.1(1); German Criminal Procedural
Code Section 374 para. 1, No. 2.
23. Griffen, above n. 21, at 11.
24. Ibid. at 10.
25. E.g., German civil code Section 823 para. 1 Civil Code in conjunction
with Art. 1 para. 1 and Art. 2 para. 1 Basic Law and Section 1004 Civil
Code; Civil Code Section 823 para. 2 in conjunction with criminal law.
26. C. M. Giebel, Zivilrechtlicher Rechtsschutz gegen Cybermobbing in
sozialen Netzwerken, NJW 977, 980 (2017).
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Judicial legal protection can be costly, particularly if
multiple jurisdictions are involved as it is likely regard-
ing online UGC.
Victims usually also have a claim for damages if their
personality rights were infringed. Damages are sup-
posed to compensate the victim for any harm to his or
her reputation or emotional well-being. Their amount
differs considerably from legal order to legal order; the
incentives for the victim to pursue such a civil legal
action vary accordingly.
2.2.3 Mechanisms to Overcome Online Anonymity
The identification of the infringer as potential perpetra-
tor and defendant is crucial for both criminal prosecu-
tion and civil legal protection.27 Social media, however,
offers a relative anonymity to its users. Commonly,
identity verifications are not required. E-mail addresses
are generally needed to register, but can in turn be easily
created using false information. IP addresses associated
with illegal postings can sometimes, but not always, be
traced back to the actual user at the time in question.
The anonymity provided is not absolute, as the infring-
er’s identity can also be revealed in the course of investi-
gations going off his social media contacts and
information. In many cases, effective legal protection
will, however, hinge on mechanisms to overcome that
anonymity.
Insofar, the protection of personality rights lags consid-
erably behind intellectual property law. The identifica-
tion of the infringer can be a question of the applicable
substantive or procedural law. By now, a number of
legal orders know mechanisms to identify online users
hiding behind a pseudonym or commenting anony-
mously. For example, in Germany, platform operators
are now allowed to disclose details about users in cases
of insult, defamation, incitement to violence and similar
instances.28 In contrast to copyright law29 and despite
proposals to that effect,30 there is, however, no specific
claim to information in that context.31 If the applicable
substantive law does not provide for a claim for
information, there might be procedural court orders
available to that end. In the famous UK Internet libel
case Motley Fool, the service provider was ordered to
reveal details about the user posting under a pseudonym
under Section 10 of the Contempt of Court Act.32
The need for identification of the infringer also affects
the ability to quickly move forward with the initiation of
judicial protection measures, above all interim legal pro-
tection. Its effectiveness is correspondingly tied to the
processing time at the competent court, with time being
27. Cf. R. Perry, and T. Zarsky, Who Should Be Liable for Online Anony-
mous Defamation?, University of Chicago Law Review Dialogue (2015)
162.
28. Section 14 para. 3-5 in conjunction with Section 15 German Teleservi-
ces Act and Section 1 III NetzDG.
29. German Copyright Law Section 101.
30. Statement of the German Federal Assembly on the 2nd amending law
of the German Teleservices Act of 6 November 2015, BT-Drs. 18/6745.
31. G. Spindler, ‘Rechtsdurchsetzung von Persönlichkeitsrechten‘, GRUR
365, at 372 (2018).
32. Totalise Plc v. The Motley Fool Ltd. Anor [2001] EWHC 706 (QB).
of the essence with the risks of quick uncontrolled pro-
liferation of the personality right violations in online
contexts.
2.3 The EU E-Commerce Directive
The basic EU rules on duties of social networks regard-
ing illegal UGC on their platforms were already inclu-
ded in the E-Commerce Directive of 2000 (ECD).33
The ECD aims to establish a coherent legal framework
for the development of electronic commerce within the
Single Market.34 The ECD does not pertain to social
networks specifically and concerns all types of illegal
content.
Primarily, it regulates the role of information society
service providers (ISPs) such as social networks. The
ECD distinguishes between three types of services
depending on the ISP’s activities, i.e. mere conduit
(Article 12 ECD), caching (Article 13 ECD) and hosting
(Article 14 ECD). Social networks fall under the third
category of hosting services, i.e. ISPs that store
information by a recipient of the service. These ISPs are
not liable for information stored at the request of a
recipient on two conditions. Firstly, the ISP may not
have actual knowledge of the illegal activity and second-
ly, the ISP has to act expeditiously to remove or to disa-
ble access to the information (Article 14, Recital 46
ECD).
According to Article 15 ECD, Member States shall not
impose any obligation to monitor the information that
they transmit or store or a general obligation to actively
seek facts or circumstances indicating illegal activity on
any type of ISP.35 Member States may, however, estab-
lish specific requirements that must be fulfilled expedi-
tiously prior to the removal or disabling of information
(Recital 46 ECD) and monitoring obligations in specific
cases (Recital 47 ECD). They may require hosting serv-
ices to apply duties of care that can reasonably be expec-
ted from them in order to detect and prevent certain
types of illegal activities (Recital 48 ECD). In summary,
the ECD only prohibits a general obligation to monitor,
while more specific monitoring obligations under
national law are permissible.36 Distinctive features of
these two categories remain to be developed.37
Legal uncertainty exists regarding the delimitation of
the types of ISPs and as to the definition of the relevant
terms, such as ‘expeditiously’, which does not give any
specification of a particular time frame in question.
Recital 42 ECD clarifies that the exemptions from liabil-
ity only extend to ‘cases where the activity of the
information society service provider is limited to the
technical process of operating and giving access to a
communication network’. It further specifies that this
activity is of a mere technical, automatic and passive
33. Directive 2000/31/EC.
34. EU Commission Press Release, Electronic commerce: Commission pro-
poses legal framework, IP/98/999, Brussels, 18 November 1998.
35. See also Recital 47 ECD.
36. Ibid.
37. P. Van Eecke, ‘Online Service Providers and Liability: A Plea for a Bal-
anced Approach’48 CMLR 1455, at 1486-1487 (2011).
154
ELR december 2018 | No. 3 - doi: 10.5553/ELR.000115
nature, thus implying that the ISP has neither knowl-
edge of nor control over the information that is trans-
mitted or stored.38 Recital 46 spells out that the expedi-
tious removal or disabling of access is in fact a precondi-
tion for the limitation of liability. Failing to comply with
that obligation, ISPs are not in the safe harbour. The
ECD has therefore led to the institution of takedown
procedures for social networks.
According to Recital 49 ECD, Member States and the
Commission are to encourage the drawing-up of volun-
tary codes of conduct. In line with this, the Commission
has recently presented more targeted approaches aimed
at hate speech and fake news.
2.4 EU Hate Speech Code of Conduct and Fake
News Initiative
Both with regard to hate speech and to fake news, the
EU Commission now works with the biggest social net-
works towards voluntary commitments without sanc-
tions for non-compliance.
2.4.1 Hate Speech Code of Conduct
In order to combat illegal online hate speech, the Euro-
pean Commission and significant IT companies
announced the Code of Conduct on countering illegal hate
speech online in 2016. This code of conduct was agreed
upon by Facebook, Microsoft, Twitter and YouTube.
In 2018, Instagram, Google+ and Snapchat also publicly
committed to it.39
The Hate Speech Code of Conduct relies on the signa-
tory private companies to take the lead, as emphasised
by the EU Commission.40 It does not primarily aim at
ensuring compliance with national laws. Social networks
firstly test the content against their individual ‘Rules or
Community guidelines’, which have to clarify that the
promotion of incitement to violence and hateful conduct
is prohibited.41
The review of UGC by the participating IT companies
is limited to notified posts. Posts can be notified by oth-
er users, special ‘trusted flaggers’ that can use specific
channels to alert the social networks and national law
enforcement authorities that learned about that content.
Upon notification, they examine the request for removal
against their rules and community guidelines and where
necessary national laws on hate speech transposing the
Framework Decision 2008/913/JHA. To that purpose,
they set up ‘dedicated teams’.42 The social networks
pledged to assess ‘the majority of valid notifications’ in
less than twenty-four hours after notification and
remove or disable access to such content, if necessary.43
38. Cases C-236/08 – 238/08, Google France and others v. Louis Vuitton
and others [2010] ECR I-02417, Rec. 120.
39. European Commission, Daily News 7 May 2018, MEX/18/3723.
40. Hate Speech Code of Conduct at 2, available at http:// ec. europa. eu/
newsroom/ just/ item -detail. cfm ?item_ id= 54300; Press release ‘European
Commission and IT Companies announce Code of Conduct on illegal
online hate speech Brussels’ of 31 May 2016, IP/16/1937.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Ibid.; European Commission Communication ‘Tackling Illegal Content
Online. Towards an enhanced responsibility of online platforms’, COM
(2017) 555 Final, 28 September 2017, para. 13.
Notification of law enforcement authorities and ‘trusted
flaggers’ should be addressed more quickly than oth-
ers.44
In March 2018, the Commission has published an addi-
tional Recommendation on measures to effectively tackle
illegal content online.45 It reiterates the importance of
cooperation of social networks with state actors and fur-
ther specifies them. Service providers are encouraged to
take voluntary proactive measures beyond the notice-
and-action mechanisms, including automated means.46
2.4.2 Fake News Initiative
In light of the fake information spread on social media
in the run-up to the 2016 US presidential election, the
European Parliament and Commission are particularly
worried about fake news ahead of the 2019 EU elec-
tion.47 So far, it has tackled the problem by setting the
Fake News Initiative into motion and threatening legis-
lation if social network self-regulation does not prove
sufficient. In April 2018, the European Commission
gave online platforms the assignment to develop a com-
mon Code of Practice on Disinformation by July 2018.48
This instrument of voluntary public commitment shall
be prepared by a multi-stakeholder forum representing
not only online platforms, but also the advertising
industry and major advertisers. The Commission also
urged social networks to promote voluntary online iden-
tification systems. A Commission report on the progress
made shall be published by December 2018. It will
include an evaluation as to whether further (legislative)
action is warranted.49
The Commission has stressed that proactive measures
taken by social networks – as they are encouraged by its
fake news initiative – are without prejudice to Article 15
(1) ECD.50 This also includes ‘using automated means
in certain cases’,51 which appears to refer to a voluntary
monitoring with the help of available filtering and/or
research software. According to the Commission, host-
ing service providers therefore do not risk losing their
liability exemption under Article 14 ECD.52
2.5 The German Act to Improve the
Enforcement of Rights on Social Networks
The recently adopted German Netzwerkdurchsetzungs-
gesetz (NetzDG) aims to raise the level of protection on
social media.53 The German legislator introduced this
Act in 2017 specifically as action against hate speech and
fake news following reports about the latter in the
44. European Commission, ibid.
45. Commission Recommendation of 1 March 2018 on measures to effec-
tively tackle illegal content online (C [2018] 1177 final).
46. Ibid, at Rec. (24).
47. EPRS, Online disinformation and the EU’s response, PE 620.230 – May
2018.
48. EU Commission Press Release, Tackling online disinformation: Commis-
sion proposes an EU-wide Code of Practice, IP/18/3370, Brussels, 26
April 2018.
49. Ibid.
50. Above see n. 45, Rec. 24.
51. Ibid.
52. European Commission, above n. 43, at para. 3.3.
53. R. Schütz, ‘Regulierung in der digitalen Medienwelt’, MMR 36 (2018).
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course of the last U.S. Presidential Election. Its name
– ‘Act to Improve the Enforcement of Rights on Social
Networks’ – highlights the difficulty the German legis-
lator perceived regarding law enforcement in online
contexts and against globally active platform operators
that do not have a bricks-and-mortar presence in the
state’s controlled territory. The NetzDG therefore cre-
ates a link to that territory the legislator can control by
requiring every social media network to designate a
domestic agent as point of contact for public authorities.
The Act did not introduce any new enforceable legal
provisions. Instead, illegality within the meaning of the
NetzDG is defined by referring to more than twenty
criminal law provisions, including defamation and
insult, public incitement to crime and hatred as well as
propaganda and use of symbols of unconstitutional
organisations. In principle, the NetzDG ascertains
existing obligations in the framework of the notice-and-
takedown procedures as instituted following the ECD.
However, it adds further specifications regarding the
self-control procedures of social networks and provides
for sanctions in case of non-compliance.
The Act sets standards for the social network’s com-
plaint mechanism and decision-making. Under the
NetzDG, social networks are obligated to institute a
procedure for complaints regarding illegal content that
allows for a timely deletion. The deadlines for removal
depend on the obviousness of the content’s illegality.
Content that is ‘clearly illegal’ has to be blocked within
twenty-four hours after receiving a complaint. If the
illegality is less obvious, the social network has seven
days to investigate and delete, with the deadline being
extended in case of participation of an ‘agency of regula-
ted self-regulation’. These agencies are private outside
institutions that were recognised by the Ministry of Jus-
tice according to guidelines set out in the NetzDG.
Above all, its examiners have to be independent and
possess the necessary expertise. Moreover, the agency of
regulated self-regulation has to guarantee an examina-
tion within seven days and foresee rules of procedure
and a complaint mechanism. In case of organisational
and systematic failure to comply, social media networks
may be fined up to fifty million EUR by the competent
public authority. This includes a systematically false
decision-making practice, but not a single failure to
remove notified illegal UGC. Social networks receiving
more than hundred complaints about illegal content in a
calendar year are also obliged to publish biannual
reports on these complaint procedures.
It is unclear how the NetzDG fits with the ECD.54 In
light of the number of issues, the German legislator at
least risked a potential violation of ECD and other EU
law principles, most notably the country-of-origin prin-
ciple as mirrored in Article 3 ECD.55 The German leg-
54. Cf. W. Schulz, ‘Regulating Intermediaries to Protect Privacy Online –
The Case of the German NetzDG’, in M. Albers and I. Sarlet (ed.), Per-
sonality and Data Protection Rights on the Internet (2018) 1, at 6 et
seq., available at https:// ssrn. com/ abstract= 3216572.
55. In support of a violation M. Liesching, ‘Die Durchsetzung von Verfas-
sungs- und Europarecht gegen das NetzDG’, MMR 26, at 29 (2018);
islator applied a public policy derogation as criminal
offences needed to be respected and the fight against
hate speech made regulation necessary.56 It can also be
argued that the NetzDG imposes considerably higher
standards on social networks than foreseen by the
ECD.57 While the NetzDG maintains the ECD’s gener-
al liability and notification system, it sets rather precise
deadlines for the deletion of illegal content, which begin
with the receipt of the respective complaint.58 In that
regard, the German legislation could possibly exceed
the Member States’ margin of discretion. Especially in
light of these EU law concerns, the NetzDG demon-
strates the legislator’s determination to combat illegal
content like hate speech and fake news more efficiently.
The means of choice for the German legislator is – not
unlike the EU Commission’s more recent approaches –
imposing more responsibility on social networks.
2.6 The Swedish Act on Responsibility for
Electronic Bulletin Boards
Sweden already regulated illegal content management
on ‘electronic bulletin boards’ in 1998 with the Act on
Responsibility for Electronic Bulletin Boards (EBB).59
According to its Section 1, electronic bulletin boards are
services for mediation of electronic messages, i.e. plat-
forms where users can upload data, read news and
exchange messages with other users.60 The Act aims at
establishing the provider’s responsibility to remove
messages that clearly constitute incitement, hate speech,
child pornography, unlawful depiction of violence or
messages where the posting user manifestly infringes on
copyright.61 The ECD was incorporated by the Act on
Electronic Commerce and Information Society Services
of 2000.62
Under the Swedish regime, owners and providers of
Internet-based information services are responsible for
illegal content on their systems.63 UGC considered ille-
gal under the EBB has to be removed by the service pro-
vider. According to Section 4 EBB, the service provider
has to supervise the service to an extent that is reasona-
ble considering the extent and objective of the service in
order to fulfil its obligations to remove or block illegal
content under Section 5 EBB. Service providers like
social networks thus generally have an obligation to
G. Spindler, ‘Der Regierungsentwurf zum Netzwerkdurchsetzungsgesetz
– europarechtswidrig?’, ZUM 474, at 477 (2017).
56. Art. 3 lit a, no. i. ECD, Bundestag printed matter 18/12356, at 13-4.
57. Spindler, above n. 55, at 478; Liesching, above n. 55, at 29.
58. Section 2 para. 2, No. 2 and 3 NetzDG.
59. Swedish Code of Statutes 1998:112.
60. C. Kirchberger, Cyber Law in Sweden (2011), at 35.
61. S. Larsson, ‘Metaphors, Law and Digital Phenomena: The Swedish
Pirate Bay Court Case’, International Journal of Law and Information
Technology 370 (2013); B.-J. Koops, J. E. J. Prins & H. Hijmans, above
n. 8, at 164.
62. Swedish Code of Statutes 2002:562.
63. G. Antonsson and A. Fernlund: Franchising: E-Commerce and Data Pro-
tection Issues in Sweden, 4 Int’l J. Franchising L. 26, at 26-7 (2006);
M. Klang, The APC European Internet Rights Project, Country Report
— Sweden, available at http:// europe. rights. apc. org/ c_ rpt/ sweden.
html.
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monitor its platforms.64 Social networks do not fall
under the explicit exemptions, as they were introduced
to implement the ECD categories of mere conduit and
caching.65
Removal obligations are limited to specific matters. Rel-
evant illegality under Swedish law is defined in Section
5 with regard to Swedish criminal law provisions on the
incitement of rebellion, agitation against a national eth-
nic group, child pornography crime, and unlawful
depiction of violence as well as the infringement of
copyrights. An intentional or negligent violation of this
obligation is a criminal offence.66
Limitations to the general obligation to monitor are set
by the law itself, as it stipulates that this obligation is
limited to a reasonable extent. Consequently, not all
UGC has to be checked under all circumstances. Peri-
odical controls can be sufficient.67 Service providers like
social networks can also make use of notification proce-
dures like user reporting functions and abuse boards, to
which users can complain about illegal messages.68 It is
however not sufficient to generally limit the social net-
work’s activity to reaction to complaints.69 How often
the provider has to go through the content of the elec-
tronic bulletin board depends on the content of the
service.70 In particular, commercial services must check
more regularly than private services.71 For areas where
illegal content is common, the provider of the area must
check regularly and remove illegal content.72 Hence,
social network providers must maintain a (more) regular
control if they learn of illegal UGC.73
2.7 Summary
In summary, traditional public law enforcement is
increasingly complemented by additional mechanisms
largely depending on social networks as intermediaries.
These mechanisms range from voluntary self-commit-
ment, code of conducts to negligence liability systems
with or without fines to strict liability approaches with
an obligation to monitor.
Law enforcement is traditionally seen as state function,
albeit relying on the active intervention of the entitled
parties. Illegal content is created and disseminated in
multilateral constellations involving the infringer and
perpetrator, the victim(s), social networks as interme-
diaries and other users that come into contact with pro-
hibited forms of hate speech and fake news. Within this
multi-player context, public and private responsibilities
of the actors involved are to be marked down.
64. See T. Verbiest, G. Spindler and G.M. Riccio, Study on the Liability of
Internet Intermediaries (November 12, 2007), available at http:// dx. doi.
org/ 10. 2139/ ssrn. 2575069, p. 109; Klang, above n. 63.
65. Antonsson and Fernlund, above n. 63, at 27.
66. Verbiest et al., above n. 64.
67. Ibid.
68. J. Palme, English Translation of the Swedish Law on Responsibilities for
Internet Information Providers, 3 June 1998, available at https:// people.
dsv. su. se/ ~jpalme/ society/ swedish -bbs -act. html.
69. Klang, above n. 63; Antonsson and Fernlund, above n. 63, at 27.
70. Palme, above n. 68, Comment to Art. 4.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Klang, above n. 63.
3 Private and Public
Responsibilities
The Internet is governed by multiple, overlapping
modalities including social norms, code, market and the
law. Social media companies serve as intermediaries,
who supply the environment enabling users to create
and access UGC. Naturally, they are not public utilities,
but private entities carrying out a business endeavour.
While they are thus prone to implement market-orien-
ted business strategies, it is the public policy makers’
task to adequately safeguard the exercise of fundamental
rights. At the same time, the individual social media
user voluntarily joins and frequents social networks
according to his habits. The task of preventing and com-
bating hate speech and fake news could be attributed to
all three groups of actors – social media users, social
networks and public policy makers.74
Could social media users not simply be trusted to make
their own choices, thus making any intervention from
the other two actors expendable (3.1)? Why should law
enforcement not be largely delegated to social network
providers (3.2) and what are public non-disposable core
responsibilities (3.3)? These questions will be answered
in order to pave the way for a comparative model analy-
sis against that background (4).
3.1 User Self-Censorship
It has been argued that commercially available filtering
software can be applied by users to block sites on the
basis of content, thus making (additional) governmental
regulation unnecessary.75 Individual users can customise
these filters in accordance with their moral and social
attitudes and by this means control their receptions.76
Rather than a censorship by the state, users only censor
themselves. Technological tools that allow the blocking
of sites on the basis of content were especially developed
to shield children from inappropriate content.77 Short-
comings of these tools have however also been identi-
fied.78 Like all technological tools, further development
can certainly improve the overall software quality.
Even with enhanced technological tools, factual limits of
hate speech would, however, be placed in hands of com-
mercial interests.79 Moreover, with the referral to com-
mercially available filtering devices, hate speech remains
accessible to all those that did not install adequate filter-
ing software. The socially destabilising force of hate
74. Cf. for a new structure of speech regulation J.M. Balkin, ‘Free Speech is
a Triangle’, Colum. L. Rev. 1, at 4 et seq (forthcoming 2018), available
at https:// papers. ssrn. com/ sol3/ papers. cfm ?abstract_ id= 3186205.
75. R. Weintraub-Reiter, ‘Hate Speech Over the Internet: A Traditional
Constitutional Analysis or a New Cyber Constitution?’, 8 Boston Uni-
versity Public Interest Law Journal 145, at 173 (1998).
76. Ibid.
77. E.g. CyberPatrol, NetNanny, SurfWatch, HateFilter.
78. M. Krantz, ‘Censor’s Sensibility: Are Web Filters Valuable Watchdogs or
Just New Online Thought Police?’, Time Magazine, 11 August 1997,
48.
79. See A. Tsesis, ‘Hate in Cyberspace: Regulating Hate Speech on the
Internet’, 38 San Diego Law Review 817, at 867 (2001).
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speech is therefore not fended off.80 Compliance with
laws lies in the discretion of users, thereby circumvent-
ing the ratio of hate speech laws. Particularly with
regard to content whose illegality stems from incitement
to violence, the danger lies primarily in reaching out to
those recipients who might not be interested in blocking
that very illegal content. Self-censorship by users is
therefore clearly insufficient for protecting societal wel-
fare and the individual rights at stake.81
3.2 Law Enforcement in the Hands of Social
Networks – Why Not?
Social networks operate platforms for social traffic
online. By creating these environments, they do not
only render communication between users possible, but
also shape it according to the platform design. Unlike
telephone landlines, they do not only make a means of
communication between a small number of communica-
tors possible for a monetary consideration.82 The suc-
cess of business models of Facebook, Twitter, Instagram
and the like is based on the creation of UGC in large
volumes and at fast publishing rates. Social media has a
magnifying effect for all ideas and opinions expressed,
while at the same time offering a (relative) anonymity to
the user creating content. It also favours the creation
and organisation of groups on national and international
levels, including extreme movements prone to generate
illegal content.83 Hence, the facilitation of the spread of
illegal content is provoked by the business model itself.
Why then not simply give the responsibility for the law-
fulness of content to the social media operators?
As platform operators, these social networks like Twit-
ter, Facebook and Instagram create the environment for
user statements and naturally govern social interaction
on their platforms. They certainly are in a good position
to carry out control84 – arguably in a better position than
state regulators.85 Social networks therefore seem to be
the point of least cost at first glance.86 Unlike national
state governments, social networks are able to set rules
on all markets they are active on (3.2.1). In addition,
they can make more effective use of technology (3.2.2).87
However, both of these apparent advantages are limited
by practical considerations. Moreover, the application
and interpretation of relevant (criminal) provisions by
social networks hold considerable dangers for funda-
mental rights and thus (democratic) societies (3.2.3).
80. Tsesis, above n. 79, at 866.
81. Ibid.
82. Cf. See T. Gillespie, ‘Regulation of and by Platforms,’ in J. Burgess,
A. Marwick, T. Poell (eds.), The Sage Handbook of Social Media
(2017), at 257-8; T. Gillespie, ‘Platforms are Not Intermediaries’, 2
Georgetown Law Technology Review 198 (2018).
83. See B. Perry and P. Olsson, ‘Cyberhate: The Globalization of Hate’, 18
Information and Communications Technology Law 185 (2009).
84. C.E. George and J. Scerri, ‘Web 2.0 and User-Generated Content: Legal
Challenges in the New Frontier’, 2 Journal of Information, Law and
Technology 1, at 10 (2007).
85. Ibid. at 18.
86. See Rec. 59 Copyright in the Information Society Directive.
87. George and Scerri, above n. 84.
3.2.1 Social Media Policies and Terms of Use
Social media operators have long had policies against
the use of hate speech as part of their corporate respon-
sibility,88 i.e. by reserving themselves the right to revoke
accounts that are against their hate speech policy. They
have contracts with their users and can unilaterally
impose terms of use for their worldwide operations.
These contracts generally contain provisions prohibiting
users from creating content in violation of the law, espe-
cially defamatory, harassing, hateful, or racially or eth-
nically offensive content. For example, Facebook’s
terms of use require the users not to bully, intimidate or
harass any user and not to post content that is hate
speech, threatening, or pornographic; incites violence;
or contains graphic or gratuitous violence.89
Such terms of use are, however, not effective, not even
for the purposes of deterrence. Social media terms of
use, much like any small print, are hardly actually read
by the end users who manifest their consent merely by
clicking a button in a pop-up window or a dialogue box.
It thus cannot even be assumed that the terms of use
create awareness amongst the users.90 Besides, users
willing to violate criminal law are likely to be willing to
violate terms of use as well.
3.2.2 Use of Technology
Social networks could implement technological tools for
the detection and blocking of hate speech and fake news
more effectively than external state actors.91 However,
not only state actors, but also social networks are con-
fronted with the large volume and high rate of publica-
tion of UGC. This renders thorough monitoring of con-
tent fairly difficult for those intermediaries as well.92
With regard to copyright infringements, filtering mech-
anisms employing digital fingerprinting, i.e. matching
uploaded and protected works, have been successfully
employed on a voluntary basis for years. The software
‘Content ID’ has been used by YouTube and Facebook
to filter illegal extremist content.93 Only after clearly
extremist content has been identified, can a hash be cre-
ated in order to compare this content via digital finger-
printing. While other filtering devices are tested, there
is currently no appropriate technology that allows for an
effective monitoring for illegal hate speech and fake
news. Striking a fair balance between fundamental
rights affected in specific cases at hand is not easily pro-
grammed.94 Filtering tools would also have to take into
account the specificities of the jurisdictions concerned.
88. K. Klonick, ‘The New Governors: The People, Rules and Processes Gov-
erning Online Speech’, 131 Harvard Law Review 1598, at 1626 (2018).
89. Facebook Terms of Use U.S., retrieved from Germany, available at
https:// www. facebook. com/ terms. php (last visited 18 June 2018), Sec-
tion 3.
90. George and Scerri, above n. 84, at 12.
91. Ibid., at 18.
92. Ibid., at 10.
93. O. Solon, ‘Facebook, Twitter, Google and Microsoft Team up to Tackle
Extremist Content’, The Guardian, 6 December 2016.
94. See D. Burk and J. Cohen, ‘Fair Use Infrastructure for Copyright Man-
agement Systems’, Georgetown Public Law Research Paper (2000)
239731/2000 for ‘fair use’ in copyright law.
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3.2.3 Dangers of the Application and Interpretation of the
Law by Private Entities
Assigning responsibility for the lawfulness of UGC to
social networks as intermediaries involves the applica-
tion and interpretation of the relevant, mainly criminal,
provisions. It is then left up to social media operators as
private entities to draw the oftentimes thin line between
legitimate exercise of the right to free speech and crimi-
nal conduct. This is namely – but not exclusively – due
to the underlying importance of constitutional law. The
interpretation of criminal legal norms safeguarding per-
sonal honour and dignity against factual claims, opin-
ions and incitement to hatred and violence as well as
their application to the individual case is strongly sha-
ped by fundamental right considerations. The applica-
tion and interpretation of the provisions of criminal law
are to be carried out in light of the affected fundamental
rights,95 such as the protection of personal honour as
part of the general right of personality, freedom of
speech and expression and potentially artistic freedom.
For example, in German law, there is no general prece-
dence of one over the other, which makes the determi-
nation of a statement’s legality – both online and offline
– particularly challenging. The German Federal Consti-
tutional Court has underlined the general principle that
certain contents of statements, especially regarding
political views, shall not be sanctioned.96 Nonetheless,
there are limits to freedom of speech and freedom of the
media, such as restrictions inherent in other fundamen-
tal rights, especially human dignity.97 The German con-
stitutional jurisprudence on that matter shows that suf-
ficient consideration of freedom of speech and expres-
sion has proven consistently difficult even for judges of
the ordinary jurisdiction with the federal constitutional
court repeatedly overturning judgements.98 The ECHR
has also consistently stressed the overriding and essen-
tial nature of freedom of expression in a democratic
society, while at the same time accepting and setting
limits in case of incitement to hatred, discrimination and
violence.99 If the application and interpretation of rele-
vant provisions is carried out by the competent state
courts, a constitutional review by the competent consti-
tutional authorities is secured. If these tasks are handed
off to social networks, the participation of the concerned
before the decision on the removal depends on the social
networks’ good will.
3.2.4 Social Networks as Rational Market Players
‘Services have a moral duty to fight illegal behaviour
online’, David Cameron is quoted as stating in the con-
text of child pornography.100 Surely, the question of
95. For Germany see Federal Constitutional Court, NJW 2943(1994); NJW
3303 (1995); D. Grimm, ‚Die Meinungsfreiheit in der Rechtsprechung
des – Bundesverfassungsgerichts‘, NJW 1697, at 1701-02 (1995).
96. Federal Constitutional Court, NJW 257, 258 f. (1958).
97. Federal Constitutional Court, NJW 1303 (2003).
98. Federal Constitutional Court, NJW 2022 (2015); NJW 2643 (2016);
NJW 1092 (2017).
99. Belkacem v. Belgium, Application no. 34367/14, ECHR, 27 June 2017.
100. R. Watts, ‘David Cameron: Web Firms Have a “Moral Duty” to Wipe
Out Indecent Images’, The Telegraph, 20 July 2013.
moral responsibility of social networks becomes more
and more pressing in light of their developing role in
society. It is linked to a number of ethical issues regard-
ing both users and network administrators.101 Notwith-
standing that worthy discussion, social networks as pri-
vate commercial entities do not serve public policy pur-
poses or other altruistic interests. They are not directly
bound by fundamental rights and by no means guardi-
ans of their protection. Reliance on private entities ‘rele-
gates governmental duties to private prejudices, incen-
tives and priorities’.102
When evaluating law enforcement strategies, social net-
works have to be seen as rational market players acting
in accordance with their interests. For example, obscene
and violent material can negatively impact advertising
revenue.103 The platform operators’ principal aim as
businesses is economic gain. Hence, the incentive struc-
ture created for these economic social networks has to
be analysed in order to determine the consequences for
fundamental right protection. The premise in this con-
text is that social networks will act to prevent the dis-
semination of illegal, but not legal content, if this out-
come is in line with its own interests like the maximisa-
tion of profits and the reduction of risks. This is espe-
cially true as most cases of illegal content are not as easi-
ly identifiable and not as severe as child pornography. In
less severe cases, both the moral scruples and the public
relations issues are weaker and so are the incentives to
combat such illegal content.
3.2.5 Conclusions
With all models delegating the responsibility of legal
tests to the private entities that social networks are, the
application and interpretation of legal norms is left to
them and their agenda, even though this is an essential
state task. As has been shown for Germany in an exem-
plary manner, this application and interpretation in con-
sideration of the fundamental rights at stake is a rather
complicated task that regularly leads to the repeal of
judgements by constitutional bodies. As the applicable
legal sources vary, the decentralised character of world-
wide social networks is no advantage.
Social networks certainly have the potential to be tech-
nical chokepoints in the fight against hate speech and
fake news. Social media policies and terms of use are,
however, not effective tools to ensure the legality of
UGC. While networks are well placed to implement
detection technology and filtering devices, no such soft-
ware currently exists with regard to hate speech and
fake news. The successful technique of digital footprint-
ing can only be used with regard to certain, severe cases.
Generally, the determination as illegal presupposes the
consideration of the context in the individual case and
the affected fundamental rights. The application and
interpretation of relevant provisions by social networks
therefore hold risks for the exercise of fundamental
101. M. Turculeţ, ‘Ethical Issues Concerning Online Social Networks’, 149
Procedia, Social and Behavioral Sciences 967 (2014).
102. Tsesis, above n. 79, at 868.
103. Klonick, above n. 88, at 1627.
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rights. Their realisation depends on the particular law
enforcement model in place and will thus be further
examined below with regard to the models compared.104
The protection of fundamental rights is not a task of
private economic entities, but one of the public core
responsibilities.
3.3 Public Core Responsibilities
State actors are the guardians of fundamental rights.
They are bound by law to respect and safeguard funda-
mental rights. Hence, they cannot comprehensively del-
egate this underlying responsibility to private actors, as
the enforcement of existing law by the state is the neces-
sary counterpart to the state monopoly on the legitimate
use of force. The restriction of the rights of the individ-
uals depends on the state’s empowerment with enforce-
ment rights. When the state entrusts private actors with
the enforcement of the law, its delegating mechanisms
are to be analysed with regard to the fundamental rights
ramifications and the effectiveness of enforcement. This
is also true when responsibility is assigned to social net-
works and public policy is implemented by shaping
their incentive structure.
4 Comparative Model Analysis
against That Background
The spectre of possibilities to safeguard social networks
against hate speech and fake news in addition to the tra-
ditional law enforcement mechanisms covers many dif-
ferent approaches. It ranges from a laissez-faire
approach with user self-censorship all the way to active
monitoring obligations of social networks. Naturally,
there is a continuum between these different strategies;
legal regimes like the ones referenced above105 can fall
anywhere along that continuum. Given the private and
public core responsibilities identified above,106 different
models will be juxtaposed and evaluated.
Self-censorship has already been dismissed, as it does
not effectively serve the purpose of fighting the dissemi-
nation of hate speech and fake news.107 Keeping in mind
the reservations regarding the delegation of law enforce-
ment to social networks,108 different schemes of network
responsibility will be examined. For that purpose, three
basic models shall be distinguished, namely a strict lia-
bility approach with an obligation to monitor (4.1), a
negligence-based liability system with a notice-and-
takedown mechanism (4.2) and voluntary commitments
of social networks to code of conducts and the like (4.3).
4.1 Obligation to Monitor and Strict Liability
Proactive monitoring obligations are generally and
increasingly used to impose a strict liability standard on
104. See 4.
105. See 2.2.-2.7.
106. See 3.
107. See 3.1.
108. See 3.2.
Internet intermediaries such as social networks.109 With
a strict liability approach, social networks are held
responsible for illegal content on their platforms even if
they did not have any knowledge of the content con-
cerned. The legal doctrine of strict liability makes a per-
son or company responsible regardless of any negligence
or fault on their part. It is conventionally applied when
such persons engage in inherently dangerous activities.
This can be said with regard to social networks as the
business models they profit of favour the creation of
(illegal) UGC.110
Obligations to monitor the UGC establish such a strict
liability regime.111 Compliance with general monitoring
obligations proves tremendously difficult in light of the
insufficient technical tools.112 Smaller social networks
and start-ups are pushed out due to the high operating
costs related to the shielding against risks, thus cement-
ing the market.113 Innovation and competition are thus
hindered by this strict approach, with economic
exchange online not being furthered.114
This model of law enforcement in social networks cre-
ates strong incentives for social networks to block all
potentially illegal content in order to avoid any liability.
Content carrying the risk of provoking controversy is
thus likely taken down pre-emptively or at the first
complaint received. There is no significant economic
advantage to hosting debatable UGC. Decisions are
therefore not primarily made on the legality of the con-
tent. Content will readily be removed or blocked before
any court involvement. Individual incentives for inter-
ventions vary largely and are not sufficient to safeguard
the fundamental rights concerned.115 There is also no
incentive for social networks to carry out factual investi-
gations first. This is all the more significant as illegality
of UGC in the context of hate speech and fake news is
only rarely evident.116 Accordingly, monitoring obliga-
tions lead to incentives to overblock.117 For that reason,
the OSCE Special Rapporteurs on Freedom of Expres-
sion spoke out against the imposition of duties to moni-
tor the legality of the activity taking place within the
intermediaries’ services.118
109. B. Kleinschmidt, ‘An International Comparison of ISP’s Liabilities for
Unlawful Third Party Content’, 18 IJLIT 332, at 346 (2010); P. Baistroc-
chi, ‘Liability of Intermediary Service Providers in the EU Directive on
Electronic Commerce’, 19 Santa Clara High Tech. L.J. 111, at 114
(2002).
110. See 3.2.
111. Baistrocchi, above n. 109.
112. See 3.2.2.
113. See Baistrocchi, above n. 109; J. Hornik and C. Villa, ‘An Economic
Analysis of Liability of Hosting Services: Uncertainty and Incentives
Online’, 37 Bruges European Economic Research Papers 13 (2017) for
all ISPs under the ECD.
114. Ibid.
115. See 2.2.
116. See 3.2.3.
117. Delfi AS v. Estonia, Application no. 64569/09, ECHR, 16 June 2015,
Joint Dissenting Opinion of Judges Sajò and Tsotsoria § I.2.
118. Joint Declaration of the Three Special Rapporteurs for Freedom of
Expression (2011) 2.b, available at www. oas. org/ en/ iachr/ expression/
showarticle. asp ?artID= 848.
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The danger of overblocking leads to chilling effects for
the exercise of fundamental rights.119 Social networks
are deterred from hosting content in legal grey areas,
and users are discouraged from exercising their funda-
mental rights such as free speech on social networks in
light of the expected quick removal of controversial con-
tent. Free speech and potentially also artistic freedom
and freedom of the media are most restricted in strict
liability systems with an obligation to monitor. This
model represents a case of ‘collateral censorship’ that
occurs when the state holds a private party – the social
networks – liable for the speech of another private party
– the user generating content – and the first private
party also has the power to control access to B’s
speech.120
Swedish law foresees an obligation to monitor.121 How-
ever, the social networks’ duty to supervise under
Swedish law is considerably relativised. Networks do
not have to guarantee that their systems are clean.122
The proactive duty to check for illegal content is limited
to areas where UGC is more likely to occur on the basis
of past experiences or context. For other areas, a notifi-
cation system can be sufficient. The Swedish system
thus combines the first model of an obligation to moni-
tor with the second model of a notification system.
4.2 Notice-and-Takedown and Negligence-
Based Liability Systems
The second model can be described as conditional safe
harbour model. Social networks are protected in the safe
harbour as long as they comply with the requirements
for dealing with unlawful content on their platforms.
With that model, social networks as such have no gener-
al monitoring obligation. Their liability for illegal con-
tent disseminated via their facilities is limited. It
depends on knowledge of the illegal content in question
and compliance with duties to take down that content.
Examples for notice-and-takedown and negligence-
based liability systems are the ECD and the German
NetzDG. According to both the ECD and the NetzDG,
social network liability is excluded if upon obtaining
knowledge or awareness of illegal content, the social
media provider acts expeditiously to remove or to disa-
ble access to the information, with the German system
defining more clear-cut deadlines than does the EU
one.123 Such systems based on knowledge or notice of
illegal content mirror the lack of adequate monitoring
software.
The rather nebulous concept of expeditious acting,
however, risks blurring the lines of the social network’s
responsibility. In terms of legal certainty, the German
model appears to be favourable at first sight as it clearly
stipulates deadlines for the takedown. While it appears
119. W. Seltzer, ‘Free Speech Unmoored in Copyright’s Safe Harbor: Chilling
Effects of the DMCA on the First Amendment’, Harv J L &Tech 171, at
175-6 (2010).
120. Balkin, above n. 13, at 2309.
121. See 2.6.
122. Koops, Prins & Hijmans, above n. 8, at 165.
123. See 2.3 and 2.5.
sensible to tie these deadlines to the time needed to
properly assess the illegality of the content, the grada-
tions according to the obviousness of illegality reintro-
duce elements of legal uncertainty and unpredictability.
As a result of legal uncertainty, it is difficult for social
networks to weigh how much to invest in the prevention
of the publication of illegal UGC on their networks.124
Legal uncertainty affects the social network’s ability to
determine a rational investment and an efficient targeted
line of attack.125
Notice-and-takedown systems can protect the exercise
of fundamental rights inasmuch as they drive social net-
works to actually test the legality of the content before
removing or blocking it. Neither the ECD nor the
NetzDG foresee specific mechanisms to ensure the test
of legality; the tiered deadlines for removal, however,
give room for adequate examination.
The option of involving a private outside institution
(agency of regulated self-regulation) provided by the
German NetzDG does not guarantee correct rulings on
the legality of UGC. Even though the examiners’ exper-
tise has to be recognised by the Federal Office of Jus-
tice, they are part of a private institution offering their
services to social networks. As such, their incentives are
approximated to those of their clients. There is thus lit-
tle to no126 added value in comparison with mere in-
house assessments by skilled jurists. Complaint mecha-
nisms are confined to the agency; there is no integration
into ordinary jurisdiction. Court reviews are – as with
all decisions taken by social networks – limited to the
period after the fact, i.e. the removal.
In contrast to the first model with a general obligation to
monitor, the incentives to swiftly remove all questiona-
ble content are limited to the notified UGC with notice-
and-takedown and negligence-based liability systems.
They still entail dangers for fundamental rights with
regard to the notified content because they cause incen-
tives to overblock as well as considerable chilling
effects.127 These incentives are enhanced by the threat
of considerable fines in the NetzDG. Social networks
will readily remove content in order to minimise their
risks, especially towards the end of the standardised
deadlines. The NetzDG has therefore been described as
bold gambit with fundamental rights.128
This danger is reduced, but far from banned by the lim-
itation of fines to systematic failure rather than to the
non-compliance in individual cases by the NetzDG.
Standardised deletion upon call minimises the risks to
124. Relying inter alia on deterrence theory, Hornik and Villa, above n. 113,
at 6.
125. Ibid., at 11.
126. M. Liesching, ‘§ 3’, in Erbs/Kohlhaas/Liesching, NetzDG (2018), at § 3
Rec. 23.
127. J. Urban and L. Quilter, ‘Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Take-
down Notices, Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright
Act’, 22 Santa Clara Tech. L. J. 621 (2006).
128. E. Douek, ‘Germany’s Bold Gambit to Prevent Online Hate Crimes and
Fake News Takes Effect’, published 31 October 2017, available at
https:// www. lawfareblog. com/ germanys -bold -gambit -prevent -online -
hate -crimes -and -fake -news -takes -effect.
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be fined or prosecuted.129 The danger actually manifes-
ted itself only ninety-six hours after the NetzDG’s entry
into force, when Twitter blocked the account of a Ger-
man satirical magazine. The magazine had parodied a
far-right politician whose social media accounts were
blocked earlier that week due to anti-Muslim posts.130
There are no data as to how much legal content has been
removed and how much illegal content kept.131 Conse-
quently, the proportionality of measures like the Ger-
man notification and fining system is hard to assess
because of the lack of (reliable) data. According to press
reports, Facebook performed 100,000 deletions in Ger-
many in the month of August 2016 alone.132 Data per-
taining to the removal of copyright infringing content
support an over-removal of content by Internet hosting
providers under a notice-and-takedown system.133
4.3 Voluntary Commitments – Code of
Conducts and the Like
Voluntary commitments to comply with a code of con-
duct appear like paper tigers, especially against strict lia-
bility or negligence-based systems with severe fines for
non-compliance. It must, however, not be forgotten that
every deletion of a legal upload, post or tweet violates
freedom of speech and expression and possibly also free-
dom of the media and other fundamental rights.
According to the third evaluation of the EU Hate
Speech Code of Conduct, whose results were published
in January 2018, the signatory IT companies removed
on average 70 per cent of illegal hate speech notified to
them by non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and
public bodies participating in the evaluation.134 For that
reason, EU Commissioner for Justice, Consumers and
Gender Equality Jourová found the code of conduct a
valuable tool to tackle illegal content quickly and effi-
ciently.135 The European Commission expressed its
conviction that the code of conduct will not lead to cen-
sorship, as it does not oblige the signatory companies to
take down content that does not count as illegal hate
speech.136
Against that background, it needs to be reiterated that
none of the models and examples presented obliges
social networks to take down legal content. As long as
non-compliance with voluntary commitments does not
129. Liesching, above n. 55, at 30.
130. Titanic Magazin, ‘Twitter sperrt TITANIC wegen Beatrix-von-Storch-
Parodie’, 3 January 2018, available at www. titanic -magazin. de/ news/
twitter -sperrt -titanic -wegen -beatrix -von -storch -parodie -9376/ .
131. German Federal Ministry of Justice and Consumer Protection, Answer
to Written question from André Hunko, No. 10/19 of 6 October 2016,
at 1.
132. Zeit Online, ‘Facebook nennt erstmals Zahl entfernter Hasskommen-
tare’, 26 September 2016, available at https:// www. zeit. de/ digital/
2016 -09/ hasskommentare -facebook -heiko -maas -richard -allan.
133. A. Marsoof, ‘Notice and Takedown: A Copyright Perspective’, 5 Queen
Mary J. of Intell. Prop. 183 (2015); D. Seng, ‘The State of the Discord-
ant Union: An Empirical Analysis of DMCA Takedown Notices’, 18 Va.
J. L. & Tech. 369 (2014).
134. Press release, ‘Countering Illegal Hate Speech Online – Commission Ini-
tiative Shows Continued Improvement, Further Platforms Join’ of
19 January 2018, IP/18/261.
135. Ibid.
136. Tweet @EU_Justice, Twitter, 07:11 – 19 January 2018.
lead to any liability or sanction, there is certainly less
incentive to overblock than with strict or negligence-
based liability systems. Nonetheless, considerable incen-
tives to delete not only illegal but also legal content
exist.
As social networks firstly test the content against their
individual ‘Rules or Community guidelines’ according
to the Code of Conduct, restrictions on free speech and
other fundamental rights are detached from legal pre-
requisites. The code does consequently not safeguard
existing laws that strive to balance free speech and rights
of third parties.137 If policies are significantly stricter
than the applicable state law, free speech is unduly
limited by deleting legal, albeit undesirable, statements.
With social networks increasingly under fire for hate
speech and fake news dissemination on their platforms,
there is substantial public pressure to act. They can
document their efforts with a media-effective signature
of a code of conduct and the publication of the percent-
age of quickly deleted notified content. The figures
published by social networks have been recently taken
into account by numerous state actors.138 They also play
a substantial role for the businesses’ public image. When
the image of a company like Facebook or Twitter suf-
fers, this can easily translate to financial loss.
Voluntary commitments gradually include more and
more proactive duties.139 The ECD principle that there
is no general obligation to monitor is called into ques-
tion by the voluntary frameworks set up at EU level.
The Commission explicitly demands proactive monitor-
ing: ‘Online platforms should, in light of their central
role and capabilities and their associated responsibilities,
adopt effective proactive measures to detect and remove
illegal content online and not only limit themselves to
reacting to notices which they receive.’140 This imposes
de facto monitoring obligations141 with the correspond-
ing dangers for the exercise of fundamental rights.
These duties clearly surpass the scope of a notice-and-
takedown system, as they also apply to non-notified
content. With regard to notified UGC, an overreliance
on trusted flaggers is to be feared. Social networks must
not refrain from any legal test in cases of notifications
from this group of users and institutions.
The encouragement to proactively deploy filtering devi-
ces, for example, by the EU fake news initiative, also
holds risks for a lawful application of relevant provi-
sions. Fully automated deletion or suspension of content
can be particularly effective and deserves support in cir-
cumstances that leave little doubt about the illegality of
the material, for example, in cases of child pornography.
Filtering without an additional case-by-case review
equals deletion without any legal test and is therefore
137. See EDRi. ‘EDRi and Access Now Withdraw from the EU Commission IT
Forum Discussions’, EDRi, 16 May 2016.
138. See 4.2 and 4.3; for the UK see House of Commons, above n. 5, at 13.
139. See for the fake news initiative 2.4.2.
140. European Commission, above n. 43, at para. 10.
141. G. Frosio, ‘The Death of ‘No Monitoring Obligations’, CEIPI Research
Paper No. 2017-15, 1, at 25 (2017).
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hazardous to the exercise of fundamental rights.142 Fil-
tering especially leads to significant chilling effects.143
While voluntary commitments might be paper tigers
with regard to their enforcement against the social net-
work’s will, they show their teeth when it comes to the
endangerment of fundamental right exercise online.
4.4 Conclusions
Social networks have gained a considerable amount of
control in areas with high relevance for the enjoyment of
fundamental rights like free speech and right of person-
ality. With regard to different models of social network
responsibilities, it has been shown that all three of them
harbour risks for the safeguard of fundamental rights
concerned, especially for the exercise of free speech. All
these models delegate the application and interpretation
to private entities to an extent endangering the lawful
interpretation and application of the criminal provisions
penalising hate speech and fake news.
The German negligence-based liability system cannot
be recommended as international policy example
because of these dangers flowing from its incentive
structure. For the same reason, an obligation of social
networks to autonomously monitor the content on their
platforms has to be dismissed. Voluntary commitments
to code of conducts can help integrate social networks in
the fight against fake news and hate speech, but not
without creating an – albeit mitigated – incentive to
overblock UGC.
5 Shaping a Superior Model
for Law Enforcement in
Social Networks
So far, public policy makers in Europe have largely
reacted to the challenge of regulating UGC on social
networks with far-reaching delegations of law enforce-
ment to social networks. Territorial governments should
realise their regulating potential (5.1). In light of all the
above, a multi-player solution with stronger public
engagement is favoured (5.2).
5.1 Regulating Potential of Public Policy Makers
The somewhat extraspatial character of the Internet
does not mean that online activities shall remain unen-
cumbered by government regulations. The approach
that cyberspace ‘exists, in effect everywhere, nowhere in
particular and only in the Net’144 and that the Internet is
‘not subject to the same laws of reality as any other elec-
142. See 4.2; for copyright S. Kulk and F.J.Z. Borgesius, ‘Filtering for Copy-
right Enforcement in Europe after the Sabam Cases’, 34 EIPR 791
(2012); E. Psychogiopoulou, ‘Copyright Enforcement, Human Rights
Protection and the Responsibilities of Internet Service Providers After
Scarlet’, 38 EIPR 552, at 555 (2012).
143. Frosio, above n. 141, at 27.
144. D.R. Johnson and D.G. Post, ‘Law and Borders, The Rise of Law in
Cyberspace’, 48 Stanford Law Review 1367, at 1375 (1996); see also
Barlow, above n. 4.
tromagnetic process’145 is outdated. Geographically
based governmental authority is not inapplicable
because of a certain non-physical nature of ‘the Inter-
net’. Transmission of online content occurs through
physical processes in specific jurisdictions by means of
physical infrastructure and processes. It has effect on
‘real people and real places’.146
Online activities indeed make jurisdictional limits visi-
ble, as online content is generally accessible beyond bor-
ders. States have personal jurisdiction over Internet
users depending on their situation.147 In case of cross-
border crimes, more than one jurisdiction can apply to a
single act. While the applicable private law can be deter-
mined by the rules on conflict of laws and international
civil jurisdiction is established in accordance with inter-
national procedural law, this is a significant challenge in
practice. Therefore, a further harmonisation and unifi-
cation of law and policy both in the area of private inter-
national law and in the area of substantive laws on fake
news, hate speech and other defamatory and illegal con-
tent would greatly benefit effective traditional law
enforcement.148 In that context, the level of (interna-
tional) regulation has to be chosen with particular regard
to legal cultures in the participating states, especially the
concept of free speech and its limits.
The development of online communication through
social media, which has inter alia physical, psychologi-
cal, and cultural effects,149 brings about major changes
for law enforcement. State actors both on national and
EU level have extensively criticised social networks for
their failure to effectively address fake news, hate speech
and defamatory UGC. In spite of this, the adjustment of
the law to such major changes is a governmental task
rather than a private one. State actors have to meet the
regulatory needs created and (re-)evaluate law enforce-
ment strategies in place with regard to the new challeng-
es and actors. The specificities of social networks cannot
justify a comprehensive delegation of law enforcement
to social networks. State actors need to ensure that the
policies they put into place produce a fair balance of
rights of personality and honour and free speech rather
than legal vacuums.
5.2 Multi-Player Solutions
Many players are involved in the sculpting of social net-
work environments.150 A superior model for law
enforcement on these platforms must therefore not
neglect their roles, above all the power relationship
between international social media companies and pub-
lic policy makers, for now mostly nation state govern-
ments. State responsibilities can be extended and
assumed in cooperation with social networks, whose
business models justify their participation in the costs of
145. M. Wertheim, The Pearly Gates of Cyberspace (1999), at 228.
146. See Tsesis, above n. 79, at 864.
147. But see Johnson and Post, above n. 144, at 1375.
148. N. Alkiviadou, ‘Regulating Internet Hate – A Flying Pig?’, 7 JIPITEC
216, at 217 (2017).
149. See Tsesis, above n. 79, at 864.
150. See 3.
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combating hate speech and fake news. Such multi-play-
er solutions can combine the advantages of the strategic
placement of social networks as points of control, while
defending law enforcement and the exercise of funda-
mental rights as basic state task.
Propositions for a superior model of law enforcement
can build upon existing concepts. The German
NetzDG system already incorporates external assessors
for non-obvious cases of UGC legality. While the
NetzDG system relegates them to the role of in-house
counsel, it shows that a cooperation with an external
assessment body is possible. A similar cooperation could
be envisioned as private-public partnership. Decisions
on the legality of UGC could then be taken by ordinary
judges. They possess the necessary expertise and enjoy
independence and impartiality. In contrast to private
(outside) institutions, their incentives are detached from
the ones influencing social networks to overblock con-
tent. They would apply the law of the particular cir-
cumstances of the case and the fundamental rights affec-
ted; their decisions would be subject to review within
the ordinary judicial system as well as constitutional
review.
Within that proposed scheme, notifications regarding
questionable UGC would thus be forwarded to public
institutions responsible for the decisions on the take-
down of questionable tweets, uploads and other UGC.
A timely evaluation could be guaranteed just like swift
judicial rulings are provided in the framework of interim
legal protection. The referral to the competent judges
can happen just as quickly as an in-house transmission.
As well as in other contexts, specialised judges can rule
within hours or days on the legality of the content, pro-
vided sufficient human resources are in place. Such a
state intervention obviously requires the attribution of
considerable government resources. Costs for this model
of law enforcement would be incurred by the state rath-
er than by social platforms as private entities. However,
in light of the benefits drawn from the business models,
social network responsibility can also be expressed in
financial contributions to such a public-private partner-
ship model. The overall cost for law enforcement in
social networks would not change. Both public and pri-
vate investments are worth making in light of the rele-
vance of both social media in today’s society and free
speech as well as rights of personality in democratic
state systems.
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